WK 002 · Week 2 · Days 8–14 · 8–14 Nov 2026 · UTC
Weekly report
Entropy Index
53.4 Uncertain
Stable −0.2 pts vs prior week · Confidence High · Data as of: 31 Dec 2025 to 9 Nov 2026
01 / Summary
Index 53.4 based on 8 of 8 signals with live inputs (Public mood, Social unrest, Cost of living, Work and jobs, Political disruption, Conflict, Technology & AI, Climate). Down 0.2 on the previous week.
02 / The eight signals
| Signal | Score | Change | What drove it | Data as of |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S01 Public mood | 23 | Stable 0 pts vs prior week | US consumer sentiment (University of Michigan) 48.1 for the month starting 1 Sep 2026, down 3.6 on the month | 1 Sep 2026 |
| S02 Social unrest | 54 | Stable 0 pts vs prior week | IMF social unrest: 24.4% of countries above 100 in the month starting 1 Aug 2026, down 5.3 points on the month | 1 Aug 2026 |
| S03 Cost of living | 70 | Stable 0 pts vs prior week | FAO Food Price Index 133.9, down 1.7 on the month; World Bank global inflation 3.0% in 2025, unchanged from the previous reading; US consumer price inflation 3.72% year on year for the month starting 1 Sep 2026, up 0.36 points on the month; IMF world inflation 4.1% in 2025, down 1.7 points on the year | 31 Dec 2025 to 1 Oct 2026 |
| S04 Work and jobs | 86 | Stable 0 pts vs prior week | US initial jobless claims 189000 in the week to 31 Oct, down 6000 on the week; World Bank world unemployment 4.8% of the labour force in 2025, unchanged from the previous reading | 31 Dec 2025 to 31 Oct 2026 |
| S05 Political disruption | 46 | Stable 0 pts vs prior week | Global economic policy uncertainty index 241.7 for the month starting 1 Jul 2026, down 41.0 on the month; World Uncertainty Index 72717 for the quarter starting 1 Jul 2026, down 5206 on the quarter; Geopolitical Risk index 150.5 in 1 Oct 2026, down 5.4 on the month | 1 Jul 2026 to 1 Oct 2026 |
| S06 Conflict | 51 | Stable 0 pts vs prior week | UCDP candidate deaths 2324 a week, 8-week average to 27 Sep, down 558 on the 8-week average a week before; Geopolitical Risk index 150.5 in 1 Oct 2026, down 5.4 on the month | 27 Sep 2026 to 1 Oct 2026 |
| S07 Technology & AI | 50 | Deteriorating −1 pts vs prior week | Tone of technology coverage 0.00 in the week to 9 Nov (four outlets, not technology itself) | 9 Nov 2026 |
| S08 Climate | 47 | Deteriorating −1 pts vs prior week | CO2 428.57 ppm at 1 Nov, up 1.29 ppm on the week; Global surface temperature anomaly (land and ocean) 1.38 °C for the month starting 1 Sep 2026, down 0.04 °C on the month; Global surface temperature anomaly (land and ocean, against the 1901-2000 baseline) 1.33 °C for the month starting 1 Sep 2026, up 0.02 °C on the month | 1 Sep 2026 to 1 Nov 2026 |
03 / What moved the needle
- Technology & AI: Tone of technology coverage 0.00 in the week to 9 Nov (four outlets, not technology itself)
Signals: Technology & AI
Deteriorating −0.1 pts on the index
Sources: epoch-notable-ai-models, gdelt-tech-tone, gdelt-theme-china-tech-share, gdelt-theme-china-tech-tone, gpr-china - Climate: CO2 428.57 ppm at 1 Nov, up 1.29 ppm on the week; Global surface temperature anomaly (land and ocean) 1.38 °C for the month starting 1 Sep 2026, down 0.04 °C on the month; Global surface temperature anomaly (land and ocean, against the 1901-2000 baseline) 1.33 °C for the month starting 1 Sep 2026, up 0.02 °C on the month
Signals: Climate
Deteriorating −0.1 pts on the index
Sources: noaa-co2-weekly-mlo, sst-oisst-world, gistemp-global, noaa-ncei-global-temp - Public mood: US consumer sentiment (University of Michigan) 48.1 for the month starting 1 Sep 2026, down 3.6 on the month
Signals: Public mood
Stable 0 pts on the index
Sources: wikimedia-top-pages, mastodon-trends-tags, fred-umcsent, gdelt-news-tone
04 / This week’s pieces
The Entropic Weather Forecast
By Neil Gibb
There has been a huge swing in sentiment this week. A long-hoped-for shift in the political and economic weather, with the Democrats' midterm victory in the USA providing a significant and jarring check on the power of an increasingly unpredictable president. Markets have responded positively to the prospect of a less volatile political environment.
On television, people are cheering and laughing. Video clips of a new generation of politicians speaking from the heart evoke memories of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King and Bruce Springsteen in their prime. Suddenly, everything feels like it was shot on film and recorded in analogue.
There is a feeling that something has been restored. A whiff of the optimism of the nineties, with pleated chinos and button-down shirts to match. Smart, young, articulate candidates have swept aside the tired and cynical.
It's a moment to bask in. An unexpected spell of late-autumn sunshine, with a sense of hope infusing the air.
We need to take these moments when they come. It's a good week to stop for a moment, celebrate a few things and enjoy the feeling that perhaps things might be moving in a better direction. Take a break, eat sushi, buy something.
But don't put your big coat away.
This is bright weather, not a change in climate.
The political forecast remains decidedly choppy. The consequences of the election are far from settled, and the prospect of further confrontation, institutional instability and geopolitical uncertainty remains very real. The desire for reparation in the USA could metastasize into a blood letting,
I find myself thinking about the final years of the reign of King George III. His recurring episodes of mania, uncontrollable rambling and increasingly erratic behaviour became his legacy. He lashed out at people.On one occasion he threw his young son across the room. What he didn’t have though was the power to mobilise highly automated weapons systems and authorise the launch of tactical nuclear missiles.
Longer term, the pressures building beneath the surface are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.
The developing El Niño looks set to bring unusually high global temperatures, with the potential for more extreme weather, drought and fires, and significant disruption to food production.
Supply chains remain vulnerable. The cost of living continues to squeeze households. And the infrastructure required to support the next wave of technological development is placing unprecedented demands on energy, resources and investment.
Civil unrest and social discontent continue to erupt across the globe. In some places, rioting seems to have replaced identity politics as the preoccupation of younger generations. This is only going to escalate.
There is a growing backlash against extractive business practices. Data centres are becoming the physical embodiment of the reach and power of oligarch-owned Big Tech: vast, energy-hungry monuments to a new concentration of wealth and influence.
Meanwhile, the economic consequences of AI are becoming visible. Jobs are disappearing, established industries are struggling to adapt, and businesses, governments and individuals are still trying to work out what comes next.
These aren't separate stories. They are interconnected pressures, feeding into one another and creating conditions that are increasingly difficult to predict.
That;s how systemic change works.
A little sunshine doesn't change the climate.
And this is perhaps the most important distinction to make this week. We should absolutely enjoy the positive swing in sentiment. But we shouldn't confuse a temporary improvement in the weather with a return to the conditions of days of yore.
Normal service has not been resumed.
Our challenge this week is to do two things simultaneously: enjoy the present and double down on preparing for the future.
Hope is a beautiful context to live in. It lowers our anxiety, lifts our spirits and gives us room to think beyond the immediate problems in front of us. We need it. We need the optimism, the laughter, the sense that things can change.
But don't bask in it for too long.
Use it. Use it as a reason to experiment, create, learn and develop new skills. Use it to explore possibilities that might have seemed out of reach a few weeks ago. Because the future is very much unwritten, and in moments like these, when the sense of possibility expands, the chances of making something better expand with it.
The Age of Abundance — But for Whom?
By Andrew Dunbar
Are we racing towards a future of human freedom, or simply building a more efficient way to leave people behind?
I've spent much of the last few years exploring AI, building with it, and becoming increasingly excited about what it makes possible. The pace of development is extraordinary. Things that would have taken teams of people weeks to accomplish can now be achieved in hours, sometimes minutes. The barriers to creating software, music, art, and even entire businesses are collapsing.
I genuinely believe we're entering what could become an Age of Play. A change to spend our lives on creation and things that bring us joy. A world where technology removes much of the mundane work from our lives, freeing us to explore ideas, pursue interests, create things and spend more time doing what makes us human.
It's a wonderful prospect.
But there's a rather uncomfortable question that we are starting to get very painfully aware of.
What happens if we automate the jobs faster than we create meaningful alternatives for the people doing them?
And perhaps more importantly, who actually benefits?
The Disappearing Safety Net
Automation isn't new. We've been replacing human labour with machines since the Industrial Revolution. From factory production lines to automated telephone exchanges, ATMs and supermarket self-checkouts, we've been steadily removing people from repetitive tasks for decades. Generally, whilst that comes with some transitional pain, thats seen as a good thing as we move away from dull grindlike work into more rewarding pursuits.
The traditional argument is that technology destroys some jobs but creates others. And historically, there's a reasonable amount of evidence to support that.
I'm not wholly convinced we can simply assume the same outcome this time.
The difference is the speed, and increasingly, the breadth of what can be automated.
Amazon has deployed more than a million robots across its operations. These machines move inventory, sort packages and perform increasingly sophisticated physical tasks. Amazon also reports having retrained hundreds of thousands of employees, which is encouraging. But as automation improves, do we expect the company to need more warehouse workers, or fewer?
And what happens to the people who don't become robotics engineers? What have we created for them?
We've already seen the effect of self-checkouts on retail. Now we're looking at autonomous vehicles, robotic manufacturing, automated food preparation and even experimental systems capable of cutting hair. Hairdressing might seem an unlikely target, given the dexterity and human interaction involved, but that's precisely why the progress in physical robotics matters. Jobs we once considered too complicated to automate are becoming increasingly accessible.
Even law enforcement is changing, with AI-supported facial recognition and automated surveillance becoming part of policing. These aren't robot police officers replacing entire forces, but they illustrate how far the technology is reaching and we’ve seen china announce in the last couple of weeks robots capable of assisting with trafffic management, public safety and even autonomous tracking and high speed pursuit and apprehension with the Rotunbot RT-G.
We're Arguing About the Wrong Things
There's an interesting irony in the current debate around AI.
Social media is awash with arguments about AI-generated music, artwork and the growing flood of what people rather dismissively call "AI slop". Artists are understandably concerned about copyright, originality and whether their livelihoods will survive a world where anyone can produce convincing creative output at almost zero marginal cost.
These are legitimate concerns.
But while we're debating whether an AI-generated song constitutes real art, we're giving considerably less public attention to the people working in logistics centres, call centres, legal departments and corporate offices whose jobs may simply disappear.
We seem more comfortable debating the authenticity of a painting than the economic future of the person who packed and delivered it.
And there's another irony.
Creative industries might actually be among the greatest beneficiaries of AI if we get this right. The ability for an individual to make a film, compose an orchestral score or build a video game without needing millions in funding is extraordinary.
That's democratisation of capability.
But there's a substantial difference between giving everyone the tools to create and creating an economy in which nobody can afford to spend time creating.
Meanwhile, white-collar workers are discovering that their perceived protection was largely an illusion. Legal research, software development, accounting, customer service, marketing, analysis and administration are all being transformed. The International Labour Organization estimated in 2025 that one in four jobs worldwide had some exposure to generative AI, although it expects transformation rather than outright replacement to be the most common outcome. Automation that causes a reduction in these jobs threatens the bedrock of our economy – the safest debts like mortgages and other secured loans sit with these people. Remove that assurance, and banking starts to look a lot less certain.
The end point is to accept that transformation isn't necessarily reassuring if the result is that ten people can now do the work previously requiring fifty.
We might still have jobs. We may just need far fewer people to do them.
The Economics of Abundance
The utopian vision is compelling.
Imagine a society where AI and robotics handle the tedious, dangerous and repetitive work. Productivity increases dramatically. Goods and services become cheaper. Healthcare improves. Education becomes individually tailored and universally accessible.
People work less because they need to, not because they can't find employment.
Instead of spending forty or fifty hours a week earning enough to survive, we spend more of our lives exploring, learning, creating and enjoying each other's company.
Why wouldn't we want that?
The problem is that our current economic model doesn't necessarily reward the distribution of those benefits. If a company can replace a thousand employees with automated systems, the immediate commercial incentive is obvious. Reduce costs, increase margins, improve shareholder returns.
There's nothing particularly surprising or even inherently malicious about that. It's what businesses are designed to do and we incentivize and reward them for succeeding.
But if every company follows the same logic, we create a rather peculiar economic problem : who buys the products when the people who used to earn the money to buy them are no longer earning it?
Productivity and prosperity aren't the same thing. We can build an extraordinarily productive economy that simultaneously leaves large parts of society economically redundant.
Who's Investing in the Humans?
We've heard plenty of discussion about Universal Basic Income. Sam Altman and others have explored various models of wealth redistribution and unconditional cash payments as potential responses to an AI-driven economy.
It's encouraging that the people developing these systems recognise the problem.
I’m not convinced that the future economic security of humanity should depend on the philanthropic ambitions of technology billionaires. There’s not exactly a great track record for success here previously.
My question is : where are our governments?
To be fair, there has been progress. The European Union has introduced its AI Act, with provisions progressively coming into force. Other countries are developing their own policies and regulatory approaches, but most of the emphasis remains on safety, transparency, competition and controlling potentially harmful applications.
These matter enormously. Yet they don't adequately answer the economic question.
Where are the serious international agreements on retraining, income protection, ownership of AI-generated wealth or the distribution of productivity gains? A company can invest billions in replacing human effort. What equivalent investment are we demanding in developing human potential and society as a whole?
I don't believe stopping automation is either realistic or desirable. I am all things considered, a vocal AI protagonist, but its not a blind pursuit. With these huge strides of accelerated development comes a need to bring the wider society with us. Perhaps we should be considering mechanisms that connect the productivity benefits of AI with shorter working weeks, lifelong education, meaningful retraining and broader participation in the wealth it creates. Not just undewriting ever growing debt mountains and enriching the pockets of tech bros on the other side of the world.
The challenge is that technology operates globally while governments largely operate nationally. Until we solve that we will continue to have competing economic interests, fragmented regulation and political systems that often struggle to plan beyond the next election.
Meanwhile, the technology continues accelerating.
05 / Sources
- FAO Food Price Index scored, data as of 2026-10-01
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Food Price Index. FAO terms were not read in the source check; confirm before publishing derived values. - World Bank global consumer price inflation scored, data as of 2025-12-31
The World Bank: Inflation, consumer prices (annual %), World Development Indicators (world aggregate). World Bank open data, CC BY 4.0. - World Bank Gini index context only, not scored, data as of 2025-12-31
The World Bank: Gini index (SI.POV.GINI), World Development Indicators (world aggregate). World Bank open data, CC BY 4.0. - NOAA Mauna Loa weekly CO2 scored, data as of 2026-11-08
NOAA Global Monitoring Laboratory, Mauna Loa atmospheric CO2 (gml.noaa.gov/ccgg/trends/). Made freely available to the public by NOAA; citation requested. Recent values are preliminary. - Climate Reanalyzer OISST world sea-surface temperature context only, not scored, data as of 2026-11-13
NOAA OISST v2.1 via Climate Reanalyzer, Climate Change Institute, University of Maine (climatereanalyzer.org). Licence not confirmed in the source check; data derive from NOAA OISST v2.1. - UCDP GED candidate events (events per week) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-09-27
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Georeferenced Event Dataset candidate events, ucdp.uu.se, CC BY 4.0. The file name carries the release version (v26_01_26_09 = January to September 2026): update the URL on each release. - UCDP GED candidate events (deaths per week) scored, data as of 2026-09-27
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), Georeferenced Event Dataset candidate events, ucdp.uu.se, CC BY 4.0. Shares the download of ucdp-events. - Epoch AI notable AI models (models per week) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-11-08
Epoch AI, Notable AI Models dataset (epoch.ai/data). Licence not confirmed in the source check; confirm before publishing. - Wikimedia most viewed pages context only, not scored, data as of 2026-10-31
Wikimedia Foundation, pageviews API (wikimedia.org). Wikimedia REST API; attribution and a descriptive User-Agent are expected. Social layer: context only, never scored. - Mastodon trending hashtags context only, not scored, data as of 2026-11-15
mastodon.social public trends API. Per-instance terms of service were not checked. Social layer: context only, never scored. - Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (FRED GEPUCURRENT) scored, data as of 2026-07-01
Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016), Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty, via FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. FRED: public domain, citation requested - World Uncertainty Index, GDP-weighted average (FRED WUIGLOBALWEIGHTAVG) scored, data as of 2026-07-01
Ahir, Bloom and Furceri, The World Uncertainty Index, via FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. FRED: public domain, citation requested. The index is by Ahir, Bloom and Furceri; check their terms before publishing derived values. - US consumer price inflation, year on year (FRED CPIAUCSL) scored, data as of 2026-09-01
US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPIAUCSL), via FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. FRED: public domain, citation requested. US only, not global. The year on year change is computed from the index. - US initial jobless claims (FRED ICSA) scored, data as of 2026-11-07
US Employment and Training Administration, Initial Claims (ICSA), via FRED. Public domain, citation requested - US consumer sentiment (FRED UMCSENT) scored, data as of 2026-09-01
University of Michigan, Surveys of Consumers, via FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. FRED: citation requested. US consumers only, not global. - World Bank world unemployment rate scored, data as of 2025-12-31
The World Bank: Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate), SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS, World Development Indicators (world aggregate). World Bank open data, CC BY 4.0. - NASA GISTEMP global surface temperature anomaly (land and ocean) not used this week (failed)
NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS), GISTEMP v4, global land-ocean temperature index (data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/). NASA GISS data are released for public use; the GISTEMP terms and baseline were not read in the source check, confirm before publishing derived values. - NOAA NCEI global surface temperature anomaly (land and ocean, 1901-2000 baseline) scored, data as of 2026-10-01
NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI), Climate at a Glance: Global Time Series. NOAA NCEI climate data are public; the Climate at a Glance terms were not read in the source check, confirm before publishing derived values. - IMF Reported Social Unrest Index, share of countries above 100 (HEADLINE) scored, data as of 2026-08-01
Barrett, Appendino, Nguyen and de Leon Miranda (2022), Measuring social unrest using media reports, Journal of Development Economics 158, 102924. IMF Western Hemisphere Department, Reported Social Unrest Index (api.imf.org). © International Monetary Fund. All rights reserved; terms at imf.org/external/terms.htm. Confirm they permit derived values before publishing. - EU27 consumer confidence indicator (Eurostat ei_bsco_m, BS-CSMCI) scored, data as of 2026-10-01
Eurostat, Consumer confidence indicator (ei_bsco_m, BS-CSMCI), European Commission business and consumer surveys. Eurostat data are free to reuse with acknowledgement of the source (Commission Decision 2011/833/EU). EU27 only, not global. - EU27 unemployment rate (Eurostat une_rt_m) scored, data as of 2026-09-01
Eurostat, Unemployment by sex and age, monthly data (une_rt_m), EU27 from 2020. Eurostat data are free to reuse with acknowledgement of the source (Commission Decision 2011/833/EU). EU27 only, not global. - IMF world consumer price inflation (DataMapper PCPIPCH, WEOWORLD) scored, data as of 2025-12-31
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, Inflation, average consumer prices (PCPIPCH), world aggregate, via the DataMapper API. © International Monetary Fund. Terms at imf.org/external/terms.htm. - Geopolitical Risk index, global (Caldara and Iacoviello), scored on Conflict scored, data as of 2026-10-01
Cite as: Caldara, Dario and Matteo Iacoviello (2022), 'Measuring Geopolitical Risk,' American Economic Review, April, 112(4), pp.1194-1225. Data downloaded from https://www.matteoiacoviello.com/gpr.htm on the download date given with each reading. No licence stated on the page; the authors ask for citation and the download date. Confirm terms before publishing derived values. Shares the download of gpr-global. - Geopolitical Risk index, global (Caldara and Iacoviello), scored on Political disruption scored, data as of 2026-10-01
Cite as: Caldara, Dario and Matteo Iacoviello (2022), 'Measuring Geopolitical Risk,' American Economic Review, April, 112(4), pp.1194-1225. Data downloaded from https://www.matteoiacoviello.com/gpr.htm on the download date given with each reading. No licence stated on the page; the authors ask for citation and the download date. Confirm terms before publishing derived values. Shares the download of gpr-global. - Tone of technology coverage (GDELT GKG: wired.com, theverge.com, arstechnica.com, technologyreview.com) scored, data as of 2026-11-15
a citation to the GDELT Project and a link to this website (gdeltproject.org). GDELT: available for unlimited and unrestricted use for any academic, commercial, or governmental use of any kind without fee - GDELT protest coverage share context only, not scored, data as of 2026-11-15
a citation to the GDELT Project and a link to this website (gdeltproject.org). GDELT: available for unlimited and unrestricted use for any academic, commercial, or governmental use of any kind without fee - GDELT news tone context only, not scored, data as of 2026-11-15
a citation to the GDELT Project and a link to this website (gdeltproject.org). GDELT: available for unlimited and unrestricted use for any academic, commercial, or governmental use of any kind without fee - GDELT political turmoil coverage share context only, not scored, data as of 2026-11-15
a citation to the GDELT Project and a link to this website (gdeltproject.org). GDELT: available for unlimited and unrestricted use for any academic, commercial, or governmental use of any kind without fee - US daily economic policy uncertainty (FRED USEPUINDXD) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-11-12
Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016), Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty, Economic Policy Uncertainty Index for United States (USEPUINDXD), via FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. FRED series USEPUINDXD: confirm series terms before publishing derived values. FRED hosts the series; the index is by Baker, Bloom and Davis. Context only, never scored. - St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index (FRED STLFSI4) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-11-06
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index (STLFSI4), retrieved from FRED. Series STLFSI4, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: confirm series terms before publishing derived values. Context only, never scored. - Share of news coverage on US elections and politics (GDELT GKG theme and location filter) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-11-15
a citation to the GDELT Project and a link to this website (gdeltproject.org). GDELT: available for unlimited and unrestricted use for any academic, commercial, or governmental use of any kind without fee. Context only, never scored. The GKG theme and country names in the filter were not verified against the GDELT codebook. - Tone of news coverage on US elections and politics (GDELT GKG theme and location filter) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-11-15
a citation to the GDELT Project and a link to this website (gdeltproject.org). GDELT: available for unlimited and unrestricted use for any academic, commercial, or governmental use of any kind without fee. Shares the download of gdelt-theme-us-politics-share. Context only, never scored. - Share of news coverage on Israel, Gaza and Lebanon (GDELT GKG theme and location filter) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-11-15
a citation to the GDELT Project and a link to this website (gdeltproject.org). GDELT: available for unlimited and unrestricted use for any academic, commercial, or governmental use of any kind without fee. Shares the download of gdelt-theme-us-politics-share. Context only, never scored. The GKG theme and country names in the filter were not verified against the GDELT codebook. - Tone of news coverage on Israel, Gaza and Lebanon (GDELT GKG theme and location filter) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-11-15
a citation to the GDELT Project and a link to this website (gdeltproject.org). GDELT: available for unlimited and unrestricted use for any academic, commercial, or governmental use of any kind without fee. Shares the download of gdelt-theme-us-politics-share. Context only, never scored. - Share of news coverage on Russia and Ukraine (GDELT GKG theme and location filter) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-11-15
a citation to the GDELT Project and a link to this website (gdeltproject.org). GDELT: available for unlimited and unrestricted use for any academic, commercial, or governmental use of any kind without fee. Shares the download of gdelt-theme-us-politics-share. Context only, never scored. The GKG theme and country names in the filter were not verified against the GDELT codebook. - Tone of news coverage on Russia and Ukraine (GDELT GKG theme and location filter) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-11-15
a citation to the GDELT Project and a link to this website (gdeltproject.org). GDELT: available for unlimited and unrestricted use for any academic, commercial, or governmental use of any kind without fee. Shares the download of gdelt-theme-us-politics-share. Context only, never scored. - Share of news coverage on China and technology (GDELT GKG theme and location filter) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-11-15
a citation to the GDELT Project and a link to this website (gdeltproject.org). GDELT: available for unlimited and unrestricted use for any academic, commercial, or governmental use of any kind without fee. Shares the download of gdelt-theme-us-politics-share. Context only, never scored. The GKG theme and country names in the filter were not verified against the GDELT codebook. - Tone of news coverage on China and technology (GDELT GKG theme and location filter) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-11-15
a citation to the GDELT Project and a link to this website (gdeltproject.org). GDELT: available for unlimited and unrestricted use for any academic, commercial, or governmental use of any kind without fee. Shares the download of gdelt-theme-us-politics-share. Context only, never scored. - Geopolitical Risk index, global (Caldara and Iacoviello) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-10-01
Cite as: Caldara, Dario and Matteo Iacoviello (2022), 'Measuring Geopolitical Risk,' American Economic Review, April, 112(4), pp.1194-1225. Data downloaded from https://www.matteoiacoviello.com/gpr.htm on the download date given with each reading. No licence stated on the page; the authors ask for citation and the download date. Context only, never scored; confirm terms before using any value in a scored signal. - Geopolitical risk for Israel (Caldara and Iacoviello) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-10-01
Cite as: Caldara, Dario and Matteo Iacoviello (2022), 'Measuring Geopolitical Risk,' American Economic Review, April, 112(4), pp.1194-1225. Data downloaded from https://www.matteoiacoviello.com/gpr.htm on the download date given with each reading. No licence stated on the page; the authors ask for citation and the download date. Context only, never scored; confirm terms before using any value in a scored signal. - Geopolitical risk for Russia (Caldara and Iacoviello) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-10-01
Cite as: Caldara, Dario and Matteo Iacoviello (2022), 'Measuring Geopolitical Risk,' American Economic Review, April, 112(4), pp.1194-1225. Data downloaded from https://www.matteoiacoviello.com/gpr.htm on the download date given with each reading. No licence stated on the page; the authors ask for citation and the download date. Context only, never scored; confirm terms before using any value in a scored signal. - Geopolitical risk for Ukraine (Caldara and Iacoviello) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-10-01
Cite as: Caldara, Dario and Matteo Iacoviello (2022), 'Measuring Geopolitical Risk,' American Economic Review, April, 112(4), pp.1194-1225. Data downloaded from https://www.matteoiacoviello.com/gpr.htm on the download date given with each reading. No licence stated on the page; the authors ask for citation and the download date. Context only, never scored; confirm terms before using any value in a scored signal. - Geopolitical risk for the United States (Caldara and Iacoviello) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-10-01
Cite as: Caldara, Dario and Matteo Iacoviello (2022), 'Measuring Geopolitical Risk,' American Economic Review, April, 112(4), pp.1194-1225. Data downloaded from https://www.matteoiacoviello.com/gpr.htm on the download date given with each reading. No licence stated on the page; the authors ask for citation and the download date. Context only, never scored; confirm terms before using any value in a scored signal. - Geopolitical risk for China (Caldara and Iacoviello) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-10-01
Cite as: Caldara, Dario and Matteo Iacoviello (2022), 'Measuring Geopolitical Risk,' American Economic Review, April, 112(4), pp.1194-1225. Data downloaded from https://www.matteoiacoviello.com/gpr.htm on the download date given with each reading. No licence stated on the page; the authors ask for citation and the download date. Context only, never scored; confirm terms before using any value in a scored signal. - Daily Geopolitical Risk index, 30-day average (Caldara and Iacoviello, preliminary) context only, not scored, data as of 2026-11-02
Cite as: Caldara, Dario and Matteo Iacoviello (2022), 'Measuring Geopolitical Risk,' American Economic Review, April, 112(4), pp.1194-1225. Data downloaded from https://www.matteoiacoviello.com/gpr.htm on the download date given with each reading. No licence stated on the page; the authors ask for citation and the download date. Context only, never scored; confirm terms before using any value in a scored signal.